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TIGHTENING THE REINS ON POLLUTION OF MARYLAND 
WATERS: ENFORCING MARYLAND'S CRIMINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AGAINST 
OUT-OF-STATE POLLUTERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To date, the overall efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) 
through civil and administrative penalties, agricultural incentives, and 
other measures designed to promote compliance with Maryland's 
water quality standards have been an overall failure. I In 1983, the 
Bay was categorized as "dan¥erously out of balance," receiving an 
overall score of twenty-three, which equates to a D- on the State of 
the Bay Report.3 As of 2006, the Bay has a score of twenty-nine, a 
D.4 This slight rise is due to an increase in the quality of certain 
aspects of habitat and fisheries.s The Bay, however, continues to 
score a D for phosphorus and toxic pollutant levels and an F for water 
clarity and nitrogen and dissolved oxygen levels.6 Despite ongoing 
efforts to improve the quality of the Bay, the state of the Bay remains 
1. David A. Fahrenthold, A Revitalized Chesapeake May Be Decades Away, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 5, 2007, at AI. 
2. The health of the Bay is an overall score out of one hundred possible points (one 
hundred points is the healthiest state of the Bay as currently known through the 
narratives of Bay Captain John Smith in the early 1600s). The current score is based 
on the average of numerical scores in three categories-pollution, habitat, and 
fisheries-which are also based on a one-hundred-point scale. The numerical scores 
correlate to a letter grade with a score of seventy or more points equaling an A+ and 
a score below twenty equaling an F. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE 
BAY 2006 11 (2006), http://www.cbf.org/site/PageServer?pagename=exp_ 
sub Jesources -publications _ sotb06 [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION 
2006]. 
3. Id. at 10-11. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 3. Under the habitat category, the Bay has an F for underwater grasses and a D 
for resource lands, while both oyster and shad populations continue to receive an F, 
scoring four and ten, respectively. Id. 
6. Id. The Bay has a raw score of seventeen for nitrogen levels and a raw score of 
twenty-seven for toxics, which is a three point decrease from 1999, when toxics 
scored at thirty; the change correlates to a letter grade decrease from D+ to D. Id; 
CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE BAY 2000 3 (2000), 
http://www.cbf.org/site/DocServer/SOTB2QOO.pdf?docID=6367. 
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"dangerously out of balance.,,7 The initial ~oal for improving the 
score of the Bay was a score of forty by 2010, three years from now. 
This goal has become nothing more than a ~ipe dream. In fact, we 
will "miss that deadline by a wide margin." According to Richard 
Batiuk:, associate director of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EP A) Chesapeake Bay Program, the current rate of progress the Bay 
has exhibited in response to the efforts to date indicates that "we're 
talking about restoring the Chesapeake decades from now, a 
generation or twO."1O 
Despite the vast amount of effort and resources poured into saving 
the Bay, the results have been far from positive, and the health of the 
Bay has only seen minimal improvement over the past twenty-four 
years. II This lack of progress is indicative of the need to add new 
types of regulations as well as tighten down those already in place. 12 
This means Maryland must re-evaluate its current efforts and develog 
an overall strategy that will increase the pace of Bay restoration. 
"This lack of progress in more than [thirty] years is especially 
staggering in the context of the public resources and attention focused 
on Bay health. . .. Clearly, what public officials have done to date is 
far from enough.,,14 
Recognizing that the Bay faces several problems, including 
pollution from sources within Maryland, this Comment proposes a 
mechanism that can be a useful tool in curtailing the continued 
pollution of the Bay from out-of-state sources. Extraterritorial 
enforcement of Maryland's criminal environmental statutes, 
particularly those pertaining to water pollution, will provide a strong 
incentive for out-of-state polluters to comply with Maryland's 
environmental standards. 15 This is because extraterritorial 
enforcement of Maryland's criminal environmental statutes would 
serve as an effective deterrent against discharging or emitting 
7. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION 2006, supra note 2, at 10. 
8. Id. A score of forty would indicate that the overall quality of the Bay is "fair" and 
that the Bay is showing signs of steady improvement. Id. 
9. Fahrenthold, supra note 1,. 
10. Id. 
11. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION 2006, supra note 2, at 10. The Bay's score on the 
State of the Bay Report has improved only six points over the past twenty-four years. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 1-2. 
14. Id. at 10. 
15. See infra Part Il.A. 
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pollutants that can migrate into the waters of the Bay, as well as hold 
those who pollute the Bay with impunity publicly responsible. 16 
While in-state pollution is also a major contributing factor to the 
lack of progress in the health of the Bay, the unique position of the 
Bay makes it equally susceptible to out-of-state sources of pollution. 
Interstate waters, such as the Susquehanna River (the Susquehanna), 
carry pollutants that eventually empty into the Bay. 17 The 
Susquehanna itself is responsible for ap~roximately fifty percent of 
all fresh water that flows into the Bay. 8 Upstream discharges of 
pollutants that occur in Pennsylvania and beyond not only affect 
those states, but also ultimately affect Maryland when those 
pollutants are finally deposited in the Bay.19 The Susquehanna is just 
one example of the many interstate waters that empty into the Bay 
and consequently deposit harmful pollutants that contribute to the 
lack of progress in the health of the Bay.2o 
This Comment seeks to draw on existing criminal law doctrines to 
illustrate a conceivable way in which Maryland, or any other affected 
state, could exercise criminal jurisdiction over an out-of-state polluter 
whose pollutants reach Maryland's waters. Part II of this Comment 
addresses the basic problems in the current re~ulatory scheme that 
extraterritorial enforcement can help to remedy. 1 Part III begins by 
demonstrating that environmental criminal law functions in the 
context of traditional criminallaw.22 With this in mind, Part III then 
sets forth the elements that must be satisfied in order for a state to 
successfully prosecute an out-of-state polluter.23 This includes 
discussion of the requisite culpable mental state, the basic 
jurisdictional requirements that must be met, and the due process 
16. See infra Part II.B. 
17. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, WATERS AT RISK: POLLUTION IN THE SUSQUEHANNA 
WATERSHED-SOURCES AND SOLUTIONS 1 (2006), http://www.cbf.orglsite/ 
PageServer?pagename=exp _sub_expeditions _susquehanna_investigate Jiskreport 
[hereinafter WATERS AT RISK]' 
18. Id. 
19. The Susquehanna is in fact responsible for "about [forty] percent of the nitrogen 
pollution, [twenty] percent of the phosphorus pollution, and a heavy load of the 
sediment pollution" in the Bay. !d. (citations omitted). 
20. "Fifty major tributaries pour water into the Chesapeake every day. [Eighty] to 
[ninety] percent of the freshwater entering the Bay comes from the northern and 
western sides." Chesapeake Bay Foundation-Save the Bay: Geography, 
http://www.cbf.orgisitelPageServer?pagename=exp_sub _watershed _geography (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2008). 
21. See infra Part II. 
22. See infra Part IIl.A. 
23. See infra Part Ill. 
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concerns associated therewith.24 Part IV addresses Maryland's future 
needs and discusses how to bring agricultural activities into the 
regulatory fold. 25 Part IV also sets out the basic groundwork for 
proposed new legislation that will allow Maryland to effectively 
protect its interest in the health of the Bay and other state waters?6 
II. EXTRA TERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT IS NECESSARY 
DUE TO A LACK OF COMPLIANCE THAT IS DIRECTLY 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO A LACK OF CONSISTENT 
ENFORCEMENT AND UNIFORMITY IN THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY SCHEME 
Criminal environmental laws are necessary tools in environmental 
regulation, because "criminal enforcement of environmental laws is 
needed to protect the integrity of the regulatory scheme, to prevent 
harm to the environment, to protect the public health and welfare, and 
to punish culpable violations.,,27 Not only do criminal laws remove 
the economic disincentive of regulatory compliance,28 they also 
reflect the widely held moral belief that these violations are wrong?9 
Essentially, criminal environmental laws act to fill in the gap left by 
the shortcomings of civil and administrative remedies in bringing 
about widespread compliance. 
A. Consistent Enforcement o/Criminal Environmental Sanctions Is 
Essential to the Success 0/ Any Environmental Regulatory 
Scheme 
Compliance is the goal of any environmental regulatory program.30 
In fact, a successful environmental regulatory program must have 
widespread compliance in order to be effective.3 Since compliance 
24. See infra Part III.B-C. 
25. See infra Part IV. 
26. See infra Part IV.B. 
27. Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of 
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REv. 487, 509-10 (1996). 
28. Id at 508-09. 
29. Id. at 488-89. 
30. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal 
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the 
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1603 (1995). 
31. Id. "Compliance is essential to the success of any environmental regulatory program 
because it 'is critical to realizing the benefits envisioned by environmental policy, 
statutes, regulations, standards, and permits. '" !d. (quoting Cheryl E. Wasserman, 
Federal Enforcement: Theory and Practice, in INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 21, 22 (T.H. Tietenberg ed., 1992)). 
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determines the true success of a regulatory program,32 there must be 
effective enforcement measures in place to guarantee compliance.33 
States and agencies have sought to bring about compliance by the 
use of incentives and deterrent measures?4 Deterrent measures 
include civil and administrative fines as well as criminal sanctions.35 
Traditionally, civil and administrative fines have been used in favor 
of criminal sanctions.36 While the use of fines has its place in 
regulation, the continued reliance on such measures has illustrated 
their shortcomings. 
The major shortcoming of both civil and administrative sanctions is 
that companies can easily absorb them as a cost of doing business.37 
This problem is due to the fact that "polluters have no economic 
incentive to comply with environmental laws because noncompliance 
results in economic benefits... while compliance exacts an 
economic COSt.,,38 For an operation to become compliant, it must 
essentially overhaul its existing treatment and disposal methods and 
install expensive technology designed to control the levels of 
pollutants discharged from a particular source.39 However, "[w]hen 
the price of installing pollution-abatement equipment exceeds the 
fines imposed, businesses have a powerful economic incentive" to 
forgo installation, and thus compliance.4o 
Because of this noticeable lack of incentive to comply with 
regulatory requirements, criminal sanctions will serve as a strong 
deterrent to noncompliance if effectively used.41 This is primarily 
because criminal liability increases the exposure of the individual 
32. Id. 'The vast regulatory apparatus we have put in place to protect public health and 
the environment amounts to empty words and deeds without compliance." Id. 
(quoting Wasserman, supra note 31). 
33. Id. at 1604. 
34. Nancy K. Kubasek et aI., The Role of Criminal Enforcement in Attaining 
Environmental Compliance in the United States and Abroad, 7 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 
122, 143-44 (2000). While incentives play an important role in regulation, this 
Comment is primarily concerned with deterrent measures. 
35. Id. 
36. Charles R. Toy & A. Michael Leffler, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 
80 MICH. BARJ. 21, 21 (2001). 
37. Brickey, supra note 27, at 508. 
38. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1553. 
39. Brickey, supra note 27, at 509; see also Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. 
L. REv. 249, 306 (1999). 
40. Brickey, supra note 27, at 509. 
41. Id. at 508. "Without the threat of criminal sanctions, the business community could 
treat civil and administrative fines as a cost of doing business." Id. 
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over the operation itself.42 This increased exposure for the individual 
not only exposes her to monetary fines but also to the prospect of 
incarceration, because criminal sanctions often carry potential jail 
time.43 
Incarceration itself is a substantial deterrent because of the 
deprivation of an individual's freedom for any period of time is not 
quantifiable in dollars.44 Additionally, incarceration has the "unique 
capacity ... to condemn and shame those who violate society's 
increasingly strict norms of environmental protection.'.45 Thus, 
criminal prosecution carries a significant stigma that not only affects 
an individual in future business dealings but socially as wel1.46 An 
individual's increased exposure to financial liability and the threat of 
incarceration give criminal environmental sanctions their high 
deterrent value. Furthermore, the use of these sanctions will be 
factored into the overall decision-making process and encourage 
widespread compliance, for they will be perceived as a real 
consequence.47 
While criminal enforcement of environmental laws is an essential 
regulatory tool that can serve to guarantee the compliance of the 
regulated community, it will only do so if it is properly applied. The 
problem remains that the deterrent function of criminal 
environmental sanctions only works through proper, uniform, and 
consistent enforcement.48 If sanctions are sporadically enforced, or 
not enforced at all, then they will never be considered in any decision 
made by a polluter; sanctions would thus fail in their role to bring 
42. Andrew S. Hogeland, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 75 MAss. L. 
REv. 112, 119 (1990). 
43. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-1107 (LexisNexis 2007) ("Any person who 
violates any provision of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is 
subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding [one] year, or 
both, for each violation."). 
44. Brickey, supra note 27, at 506 (asserting that '1ail time is one cost of business that 
cannot be passed on to the consumer"). 
45. Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 889, 896 (1991). 
46. Brickey, supra note 27, at 506. ("[C]orporate officials ... belong to 'a social group 
that is exquisitely sensitive to status deprivation and censure. "') ld. (quoting 
Hedman, supra note 45, at 895); see also Jeremy Firestone, Enforcement of Pollution 
Laws and Regulations: An Analysis of Forum Choice, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 105, 
112-13 (2003) (stating that criminal sanctions, especially in the white-collar world of 
the corporate officer, carry a stigma that can haunt a person socially and 
professionally for the remainder of her career). 
47. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1604. 
48. ld. at 1600. 
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about compliance. The next section of this Comment will discuss the 
problems of consistent enforcement and lack of uniformity within the 
regulatory scheme in general and then demonstrate how 
extraterritorial enforcement of criminal environmental sanctions may 
help a downstream state protect its own interests. 
B. The Origins of the Current Lack of Uniformity and Consistent 
Enforcement 
Due to the apparent shortcomings of civil and administrative 
remedies, criminal environmental laws must be applied consistently 
to achieve the environmental and public welfare policies and goals 
that are the basis of environmental regulation.49 Furthermore, 
criminal sanctions require consistent and effective enforcement to 
overcome the disincentives for full compliance and deter the 
regulated community from engaging in continued violations. While 
criminal sanctions serve as part of an effective enforcement system, 
their deterrent value will disappear if they are poorly enforced. Thus, 
their role in bringing about compliance will be reduced to nil: 
To achieve compliance, an effective enforcement system 
must exist. Enforcement is the use of legal tools, formal and 
informal, to compel compliance by imposing legal sanctions 
or penalties. Effective enforcement is based on the theory 
of deterrence, which holds that a strong enforcement 
program deters the regulated community from violating in 
the first place, deters specific violators from further 
violations, and deters the public from violating other laws. 
Effective enforcement accomplishes these goals by 
providing "visible examples to encourage others in the 
regulated pOQulation to maintain desired behavior to avoid a 
similar fate.,,5o 
The major impediment to effective enforcement is the lack of 
uniformity of standards and enforcement between states.51 A state 
could have a strict standard that is rarely enforced or a weak standard 
that is enforced regularly with little effect. 52 This lack of uniform 
standards and enforcement can be directly attributed to the economic 
49. ld. at 1604. 
50. Jd. (quoting Clifford Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in 5R 243, 243 (Paul 
Portneyed., 1990)). 
51. Jd. at 1574. 
52. ld. 
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or business concerns of the state as well as the political concerns of 
its elected officials.53 
States generally feel economic effects immediately, while 
environmental harms occur over time. Thus, "[ s ]tate officials 
seeking to keep existing industry and to lure new business into their 
state are acutely aware of the political danger of creating a hostile 
business atmosphere through vigorous enforcement" of 
environmental standards. 54 The result is that states "feel intense local 
political pressure to slacken enforcement" in order to promote 
economic development.55 Essentially, economic concerns shape the 
environmental policy-making decisions of officials concerned with 
re-election because "[ n]o politician wants to open herself up to the 
charge of opposing, or not vigorously promoting, statewide business 
development. ,,56 Although a state may look good on paper by having 
strict environmental standards, this is just for appearances if the state 
is unwilling to enforce them. 
This problem is furthered by the lack of federal involvement in the 
matter. Due to the lack of an adequate enforcement strategy against 
states that fail to assess sufficient penalties, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) will not step in and force a state's hand.57 
The result is that "no effective check exists for states that assess little 
or no penalties on [Clean Water Act] violators.,,58 Because of this 
lack of checks, a state can continue to assess minimal fines, fostering 
an economic advantage at the cost of its own and neighboring states' 
environments without interference from the federal government. 59 
These problems combine to leave a downstream state, such as 
Maryland, vulnerable to the acts of upstream polluters. The 
following hypothetical illustrates the vulnerability of states, like 
Maryland, to the political or business climate of a neighboring state.60 
Imagine a polluter in a neighboring state that is a large corporation 
or facility. This polluter has determined that it would rather pay the 
civil fines for noncompliance and incorporate them into the cost of 
business, rather than implement the necessary treatment procedures 
that would limit the adverse effects of its emissions or discharges. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1575. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1588. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. at 1589, 1603. 
60. See generally id. at 1615-16. 
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Furthermore, this facility is located in an area whose local economy 
is dependent upon it-perhaps it is a major employer. Because of the 
role it plays in the community, the state in which it is located is 
unwilling to impose stricter penalties for noncompliance with 
environmental regulations. Essentially, the facility is now permitted 
to adversely affect Maryland's waters because of the migratory 
nature of its pollutants and do so with impunity.61 
In such an instance, what recourse does Maryland have? A state 
may not force another state to prosecute its own citizens if it chooses 
not to. How then can an affected state truly protect its own 
environmental interests if there are no effective deterrents to prevent 
the out-of-state discharge of pollutants that reach its waters? 
The above hypothetical situation demonstrates that Maryland 
cannot rely on the policies of neighboring states to effectively protect 
it from pollution emanating from within those states. While the 
Office of the Maryland Attorney General has successfully prosecuted 
environmental crimes that occur within state boders,62 Maryland still 
faces the severe problem of out-of-state pollution contaminating its 
water resources via interstate waterways. 6 Maryland has a legitimate 
state interest in curbing the pollution that enters state waters from out 
of state sources,64 and that state can no longer rely on either 
neighboring states or the federal government to implement pollution 
control standards that meet state needs. 
Although the states of the Chesapeake Bay watershed, including 
Maryland, have entered into several interstate compacts with 
intentions of setting uniform standards to address such problems,65 
61. This hypothetical may be applied equally to the agricultural industry of a state. In the 
case of agricultural regulation, a state may be reluctant to impose regulations on the 
industry because of its role in the state's economy or because a politician does not 
want to lose popularity by being perceived as attacking farmers. See Douglas R. 
Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory 
Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 
21, 25 (2002). 
62. See, e.g., Neuron Prods., Inc. v. Dep't of the Env't, 166 Md. App. 549, 553, 561-62, 
890 A.2d 858, 860, 865 (2006). 
63. WATERS AT RISK, supra note I 7, at 1. 
64. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-302 (LexisNexis 2007) (stating that "the quality of the 
waters of this State is vital to the interests of the citizens of this State"); see also infra 
Part 1II.B.3.a.iii. 
65. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 5-301 (LexisNexis 2007); see also James M. 
McElfish, Jr. & Lyle M. Varnell, Designing Environmental Indicator Systems for 
Public Decisions, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 73 & n.107 (2006) (describing the 
multi-state Chesapeake Bay Program as a "commitment" by Maryland, several 
neighboring states, the EPA, and the Chesapeake Bay Commission to reduce 
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they are far from successful. 66 These compacts take the unrealistic 
approach that economic competition between the member states as 
well as the individual economic concerns of each state will not 
undermine the uniform enforcement of these standards in each state.67 
If the aims of these compacts were truly adhered to, a state like 
Pennsylvania would take more drastic measures to curtail the levels 
of nitrogen and phosphorus deposited in the Susquehanna River by 
agricultural activities.68 One major factor that has prevented 
Pennsylvania from imposing stricter regulations on such farms69 is 
the immediate economic imQact that translates directly to a state 
official's political concerns.70 Thus, the quality of not only 
Pennsylvania's environment, but Maryland's as well, is placed in the 
backseat for economic vitality. 
The lack of effective enforcement of environmental laws leaves 
downstream states like Maryland vulnerable. Pollution is migratory 
in nature and is carried by whatever medium it enters. Thus, its 
effects are felt not on~ where the pollution is discharged, but also 
where it comes to rest. Because these discharges often violate more 
than just the laws of the polluter's state,n affected neighboring states 
sedimentation in the Bay and acknowledging that the project had failed to reach its 
goals as of 2006). 
66. See, e.g., Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of 
Design, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 1131, 1133-35 (2006). 
67. ld. at 1146. 
68. Stricter regulation of these farms would have a profound effect on the overall levels 
of nitrogen pollution in the Bay. See generally WATERS AT RISK, supra note 17, at 2-
4. 
69. Stricter regulations, such as classifying these farms as "concentrated feeding 
operations," would qualify the farms' operations as point sources of pollution and 
consequently subject them to effluent permit regulations. See Concerned Area 
Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farms, 34 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1994). 
70. See David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory 
Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 
515,527-28 (1996). 
71. Mark S. Pollock, Local Prosecution of Environmental Crime, 22 ENVT'L L. 1405, 
1405 (1992). 
72. Id. 
Violations of federal and state environmental laws vary in the 
seriousness of their impact, and often cross jurisdictional boundaries. 
Pollutants discharged unlawfully by responsible parties tend to migrate 
in the environment from one medium to another-soil to water, water 
to air, city to county, state to state, and nation to nation. As a result of 
the geographical migration of pollutants, a given pollution discharge 
may violate not only federal law, but state law, and local ordinances as 
well. 
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must be able to protect their own interests against the shortcomings 
of another state's enforcement structure. A state exercising its 
criminal jurisdiction extraterritorially for environmental crimes is not 
only permissible,73 but is also necessary for a state to protect its own 
citizens and environment from the external threat created by 
another's lax regulation or enforcement. 
III. BY APPL YING TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
DOCTRINES, MARYLAND CAN SUCCESSFULLY 
PROSECUTE OUT-OF-STATE CRIMINAL POLLUTERS 
While the justification exists for a downstream state to criminally 
prosecute out-of-state polluters, a mechanism to facilitate this goal 
has yet to be discussed. This section sets forth the basic legal 
premises upon which the criminal prosecution of out-of-state 
polluters may function. Before discussing the actual legal 
mechanisms, this section will first place environmental criminal laws 
in the context of traditional criminal law.74 Next, this section will 
explore how to satisfy the requirements of scienter as well as how a 
state may satisfy the various jurisdictional re~uirements necessary to 
hold an out-of-state polluter criminally liable. 
A. Traditional Criminal Law Doctrines May Be Used in 
Prosecuting Environmental Crimes Because Criminal 
Environmental Laws Function in the Context o/Traditional 
Criminal Law 
Environmental criminal law, although relatively new in 
comparison, should be applied the same as traditional criminal laws, 
because both focus on the prevention of social harm through 
deterrence.76 Truly, the 
[M]ajor goal of the prosecutor in prosecuting any crime is 
deterrence. The hope and goal of any prosecutor in 
obtaining a murder conviction, and the execution of the 
resulting sentence, is to deter homicide in the state or county 
where the prosecution occurred. 
Id. 
73. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 617, 647 (2006). 
74. See infra Part lILA. 
75. See infra Part III.B. 
76. Brickey, supra note 27, at 507-08 ("[E]nvironmental crimes fit comfortably within 
the criminal law's concern for the prevention of social harm."). 
468 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
The prosecution of environmental violations IS no 
different.77 
While the social hann that traditional criminal law is meant to 
prevent is generally broad in scope, environmental criminal law is 
merely a more specific type of criminal law in that it seeks to prevent 
a widespread and continuous hann to the physical environment and 
public welfare.78 
Criminal sanctions also act as a manifestation of society's 
detennination that certain activities are wrong and the violation of 
certain standards will not be tolerated.79 Criminal sanctions for 
environmental violations are no different; they reflect the societal 
values that degradation of the environment for capital gain is 
unacceptable, and violators should be made an example to others.80 
For environmental criminal sanctions to operate they must satisfy 
the nonnal requirements for any legitimate criminal charge. First, the 
elements of the crime must be satisfied.8l Furthennore, and most 
important to extraterritorial enforcement, jurisdiction must be 
established.82 Not only must the court have proper subject matter 
jurisdiction, but it must also demonstrate that it has territorial 
jurisdiction over the claim as well as personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. 83 
77. Pollock, supra note 71, at 1411. 
78. Brickey, supra note 27, at 507 ("Environmental crimes have the potential to cause 
catastrophic harm to the environment, public health, and local economies and ways 
of life."). 
79. Id. at 488-89. 
80. Hedman, supra note 45, at 889. "Over seventy percent of the American public favors 
the use of jail terms 'when companies are found guilty of deliberately violating 
pollution laws.'" !d. (quoting ENVIRONMENTAL OPINOIN STUDY, INC., A SURVEY OF 
AMERICAN VOTERS: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ENIVRONMENT 14 (1990)). 
81. Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 89 (1949) ("An essential part of a 
procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the 
element[s] of the crime charged shall be proved .... "). 
82. Spencer, supra note 73, at 625. 
83. Id. 
A court (state or federal) may not enter a binding judgment in 
resolution of a matter unless it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
dispute. Adjudicatory jurisdiction is traditionally thought to have two 
dimensions: first, a subject matter component that identifies the types 
of cases that a court may hear; and second, a personal component that 
refers to the ability of a court to bind a particular individual or entity as 
a defendant to the judgment rendered. 
Id. at 617-18. 
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Before delving into the various jurisdictional requirements, It IS 
first appropriate to investigate the requisite culpable mental state to 
hold a polluter criminally liable and in particular, whether there need 
be any level of scienter at all. 
B. The Requisite Level of Scienter for Environmental Criminal 
Sanctions Arisingfrom Water Pollution 
Maryland's criminal environmental statutes pertaining to water 
pollution do not state a requisite scienter requirement such as 
"knowingly," except for those dealing with fraud or falsification.84 
The lack of a specified level of intent, coupled with the language 
used in Maryland's criminal water statutes such as "[a]ny person who 
violates any provision of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor,,,85 
normally would suggest a standard of strict liability.86 The Supreme 
Court, however, expressed contempt for the general use of strict 
liability in the interpretation of statutes that are silent on the reguisite 
level of scienter and whose penalties result in incarceration.87 Yet, 
the Supreme Court did not rule that such statutes are 
unconstitutional. 88 
Despite being constitutional as drafted, most courts interpret the 
lack of a specific level of scienter to require a level of general 
intent. 89 This level of general intent is akin to a general awareness of 
the conduct itself, that is, the defendant must know that the pollution 
is being discharged and that the substance is in fact a pollutant.9o 
This level of intent, however, does not require any awareness on the 
part of the defendant that the conduct is in violation of any laws.91 
Essentially, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the offender knew 
of the act or omission but not whether he knew it violated the law.92 
84. While Maryland's criminal water pollution statutes do not include a requisite level of 
scienter, the criminal statutes under the air pollution subtitles do include "knowingly" 
as the requisite level of scienter. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-609.I(b)(I)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2007). 
85. See id. at § 4-1l6(a). 
86. DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 6.03[1], 6-
43 (2007). 
87. Morissette v. United States, 34 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952). 
88. See RIESEL, supra note 86 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
437 (\ 978». 
89. /d. (citing United States v. Weitzenhoff, I F.3d 1523 (9th Cir. 1993), amended by 35 
F.3d 1275 (9thCir. 1994». 
90. Id. 
91. ld. 
92. ld. 
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The basic premise in this type of analysis is that "ignorance of the 
law is no excuse.,,93 
One of the initial problems of requiring a knowingly level of 
scienter was the fact that corporate officials would repeatedly and 
purposely insulate themselves from any exposure that would cause 
them to know what their facilities were doing.94 Thus, prosecutors 
were faced with the difficulty of holding corporate officers liable for 
the actions of a corporation, because they could not show that these 
individuals actually knew of the activity that was occurring.95 
Several doctrines were developed to respond to this problem. In 
particular, the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine was 
developed, and has since become a major prosecutorial tool for 
holding corporate officers liable.96 The responsible officer doctrine 
essentially holds a corporate officer accountable whether due to her 
position she knew or should have known, either through a 
supervisory role or through giving directives to subordinates, about 
the activity that resulted in the violation.97 Thus, under a typical 
interpretation of a general intent requirement, corporate officials may 
be held individually liable for the acts or omissions of the corporation 
if a finder of fact can infer that they knew or should have known.98 
A more general approach to the requisite level of intent for statutes 
that are silent on the necessary level of scienter is the "public welfare 
statute" doctrine.99 The public welfare statute doctrine allows for the 
suspension of any mens rea requirement when a prohibited activity is 
criminalized under a statute that is aimed at protecting the public 
welfare, health, and safety.IOO The Supreme Court has held that 
application of the doctrine does not violate a defendant's due process 
rights. 101 The Supreme Court reached its decision by inferring that 
"Congressional silence [signifies] that Congress did not intend to 
require the prosecution to prove mens rea to establish the offense, 
imposing a form of strict criminalliability."lo2 
93. Id. at § 6.03[1], 6-47. 
94. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., et aI., Criminal Enforcement of State Environmental 
Laws: The Ohio Solution, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 217,227 (1990). 
95. Id. 
96. Hogeland, supra note 42, at 119. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. RIESEL, supra note 86, at § 6.03[1], 6-49 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600 (1994». 
100. Id. at § 6.03[4],6-65 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922». 
101. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943). 
102. Firestone, supra note 46, at 114 n.53; see also Staples, 511 U.S. 600. 
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While typically, proof of scienter is required for criminal 
prosecutions,103 the Court approved the suspension of mens rea for 
prosecution based on legislation whose "penalties serve as effective 
means of regulation.,,104 Since environmental crimes are intended as 
a means of enhancing regulation as opposed to being purely punitives they properly fall under the public welfare statute doctrine. lo 
Furthermore, because the Maryland General Assembly characterized 
water pollution as a "menace to public health and welfare,,,106 
Maryland's water pollution criminal environmental statutes are 
within the class of statutes that fall under the public welfare statute 
doctrine. 107 Accordingly, "criminal prosecution can dispense with 
the necessity to show scienter in the enforcement of statutes aimed at 
promoting public welfare,,,108 and the application of the doctrine to 
violations of Maryland's water pollution criminal environmental 
statutes is appropriate. 
Additionally, environmental crimes are exactly the types of crimes 
for which the public welfare statute doctrine was created. The 
doctrine evolved from increasing industrialization and the dangers 
that this increase presented to the public at large. 109 As 
industrialization increased, so did the number of "regulations which 
heighten[ ed] the duties of those in control of particular industries, 
trades, proferties or activities that affect public health, safety or 
welfare."ll The Supreme Court officially applied the doctrine to 
environmental crime in United States v. International Mineral & 
Chemical Corp. III In that decision, the Supreme Court held that 
suspension of the element of mens rea was proger for the prosecution 
of criminal violations of environmental laws. I The Supreme Court 
held that members of the regulated community could not escape 
culpability by claiming ignorance of a regulation because when 
"dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that 
103. RIEsEL, supra note 86, at § 6.03[1],6-42. 
104. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281-82. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
106. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 4-402, 9-302(b) (LexisNexis 2007). 
107. See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (recognizing that the public 
welfare doctrine applies to statutes aimed at achieving social betterment). 
108. RIESEL, supra note 86, at § 6.03[4], 6-65 (citing Balint, 258 U.S. at 252). 
109. See Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 644,547 A.2d 1041, 1043-44 (1988); see also 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952). 
110. Id. at 1043-44, 547 A.2d at 1044 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. at 254). 
Ill. 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
112. Id. at 564-65. 
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anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with 
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.,,113 
Maryland courts recognize and apply the public welfare statute 
doctrine in criminal cases. 114 The doctrine, however, has been 
applied with varying results. 115 In McCallum v. State, 116 for instance, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the suspension of proving 
mens rea in the criminal prosecution of a driver caught driving with a 
suspended license was only acceptable for those charges that carried 
with them monetary fines; the court failed to extend the mens rea 
suspension to the portions of the statute that imposed a sentence of 
. . 117 Wh . Ow S 118 h C fA I mcarceratIOn. ereas mens v. tate, t e ourt 0 ppea s 
of Maryland held that it did not violate a defendant's due process 
rights to suspend the scienter requirement under Maryland's statutory 
rape statute despite the penalty of incarceration for eighteen 
months. 119 Thus, the Court or Appeals of Maryland seems reluctant 
to apply the doctrine if a resulting penalty is incarceration and the 
infraction is minimal. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has noted, however, that 
ultimately, it is a case of statutory construction as to whether the 
Maryland General Assembly intended for the suspension of a scienter 
requirement in applying the public welfare statute doctrine. 120 The 
statutory scheme of Maryland's environmental criminal statutes show 
that the Maryland General Assembly specifically intended to remove 
any scienter requirement for the water pollution criminal provisions. 
The criminal statutes pertaining to air pollution and disposal of toxic 
wastes state that the defendant must act knowingly.121 Whereas, the 
water pollution criminal statutes reflect a conscious removal of any 
requisite mens rea by the Maryland General Assembly for violations 
113. ld. at 565. 
114. See Owens v. State, 352 Md. 663, 724 A.2d 43 (1999); McCallum v. State, 321 Md. 
451,583 A.2d 250 (1991); Dawkins, 313 Md. 638,547 A.2d 1041. 
115. See, e.g., Owens, 352 Md. at 690, 724 A.2d at 56 (holding that the public welfare 
statute doctrine served to protect "children from the potentially devastating effects of 
sexual abuse and exploitation"); McCallum, 321 Md. at 456,583 A.2d at 25, 252-53 
(holding that driving on a suspended license was "not one of those 'public welfare' 
offenses"); Dawkins, 313 Md. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047 (holding that possession of a 
dangerous controlled substance is a crime against the public welfare). 
116. 321 Md. 451, 583 A.2d 250 (1991). 
117. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 456-57, 583 A.2d at 252-53. 
118. 352 Md. 663, 724 A.2d 43 (1999). 
119. ld. at 679, 724 A.2d at 51. 
120. See McCallum, 321 Md. at 456,583 A.2d at 252. 
121. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 2-609.1 (b)( I )(i)-(iii) (LexisNexis 2007). 
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of Maryland's water pollution laws. I22 Coupling this statutory 
scheme with the express declaration of water pollution as a menace to 
public health and safety, the application of the public welfare statute 
doctrine to environmental criminal water pollution violations is 
proper. 
C. Extraterritorial Enforcement of Maryland's Criminal 
Environmental Statutes Requires that Maryland Courts have 
Proper Subject Matter, Territorial, and Personal Jurisdiction 
In order to properly pass a binding judgment on a defendant, courts 
must have proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear a criminal 
case,123 along with proper territorial jurisdiction over the criminal 
act,124 and personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 125 In the case of 
extraterritorial enforcement of criminal environmental laws, 
Maryland's courts have proper subject matter jurisdiction to try a 
case against an out-of-state polluter. 126 Additionally, because 
Maryland has concurrent jurisdiction over the tidewater portions of 
tributaries of the Bay, Maryland has territorial jurisdiction over those 
out-of-state acts that cause pollution to enter the Bay via interstate 
waterways.127 Finally, Maryland may clearly gain personal 
jurisdiction over defendants who have established minimum contacts 
with the state. 128 In the cases where minimum contacts are lacking, 
however, personal jurisdiction is not as clear. 129 
1. The Clean Water Act and Maryland's Own Statutory Scheme 
Confer Proper Subject Matter Jurisdiction on Maryland Courts 
A Maryland court has proper subject matter jurisdiction to try 
criminal defendants who are charged with violating Maryland's 
criminal water pollution statutes by out-of-state activities. The 
subject matter jurisdiction of Maryland's courts to hear such cases is 
found within the Clean Water Act itself, as well as within Maryland's 
own statutory scheme. 
122. See, e.g., id. § 9-343. 
123. Spencer, supra note 73, at 625. 
124. State v. Luv Phann., Inc., 388 A.2d 190, 195 (N.H. 1978). 
125. Spencer, supra note 73, at 625. 
126. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-3 13 (c) (LexisNexis 2007). 
127. See State v. Butler, 353 Md. 67,78,724 A.2d 657, 663 (1999). 
128. Int'I Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
129. See, e.g., Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984). 
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a. Maryland's courts have proper subject matter jurisdiction under 
the Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act places the "primary responsibility to 'prevento 
reduce, and eliminate pollution'" upon the states themselves. 13 
Furthermore, states are free to adopt and enforce "any standard or 
limitation respecting discharges of pollutants" as well as "any 
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution.,,!3! Thus, 
under the Clean Water Act, a state, such as Maryland, is free to adopt 
any regulation it deems fit to control pollution of its waters and to 
enforce proper sanctions for violations of these regulations. 
The only limitation imposed upon the states by the Clean Water 
Act is that a state may not implement any regulation or effluent 
limitation that is less stringent than federal requirements. 132 States 
are therefore free to adopt regulations and effluent limitations that are 
more stringent than federal standards. 133 Essentially, the federal 
standards serve as a minimum or base level which individual states 
may increase at their discretion. 134 Not only maya state create and 
implement regulations that are more stringent than the federal 
minimums, but a state may also enforce those limitations against an 
upstream state. 135 
A state's ability to assess violations of its water quality standards 
against an out-of-state source is not affected by the Clean Water Act. 
The Clean Water Act plainly states that it does not remove or curtail 
the jurisdiction of any state over its waters or those waters shared 
with other states.!36 Thus, it is sound practice under the Clean Water 
Act for a state to exercise its jurisdictional powers beyond state 
borders along shared waters. 
Oregon, for example, has extended its jurisdiction over water 
pollution control to "all ... bodies of surface or underground waters, 
natural or artificial, inland or coastal,... which are wholly or 
130. Hodas, supra note 30, at 1555; (quoting Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (West 
2006)). 
131. Clean Water Act §§ 1370(1)(A}-(B). 
132. Id. § 1370(2). 
133. See Hodas, supra note 30, at 1556. 
134. Id. 
135. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 106 (1992) (stating the EPA may require a 
point source located in an upstream state to comply with the water quality standards 
of a neighboring downstream state). 
136. Clean Water Act § 1370(2). The Clean Water Act states that "nothing in this chapter 
shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or 
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of 
such States." Id. 
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partially within or bordering the state or within its jurisdiction.,,137 
Additionally, it is a statutory violation to "[ c ]ause pollution of any 
waters of the state or place or cause to be placed any wastes in a 
location where such wastes are likel~ to escape or be carried into the 
waters of the state by any means.,,13 By defining "the waters of the 
state" to include those waters "partially within or bordering the 
state,,,139 and using the language that "no person shall ... [c]ause 
pollution of any waters of the state,,,140 Oregon has established a 
statutory scheme that allows for it to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-
state activities that cause pollution within state waters. Oregon's 
statutory scheme is an example of how a state may work within the 
Clean Water Act and gain jurisdiction over out-of-state activity that 
has adverse effects on its environment. 
Maryland has adopted its own statutory scheme to extend its 
jurisdiction to interstate waters that enter the state. 141 The language 
of the statute, however, is not as clearly defined as in Oregon's 
statute. 142 Nonetheless, it is sufficient to gain subject matter 
jurisdiction over out-of-state activities that pollute Maryland's 
waters. 
b. Maryland's current statutory scheme also confers proper subject 
matter jurisdiction on its courts 
Maryland's statutory scheme provides an additional basis for the 
subject matter jurisdiction of its courts over out-of-state activities that 
pollute Maryland's waters. The Maryland General Assembly brought 
the interstate waterways that empty into the Bay within Maryland 
courts' jurisdiction by defining them as "Waters of the State.,,143 
Specifically, the Maryland General Assembly defined Waters of the 
State to include "[t]he Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.,,144 The 
Chesapeake Bay watershed incorporates six states and includes fi~ 
major tributaries, including the Susquehanna and Potomac Rivers.1 5 
By including the tributaries of the Chesapeake Bay in this definition, 
137. OR. REv. STAT. § 4688.005(10) (2005). 
138. Jd. § 468B.025. 
139. Jd. § 468B.005. 
140. Jd. § 468B.025. 
141. For a discussion of how Maryland's statutory scheme extends the state's jurisdiction 
to interstate waters, see infra Part III.C.1.b. 
142. The benefits of Oregon's statutory scheme and the ways in which it may serve as a 
model for Maryland are expanded upon later in this Comment. See infra Part IV.B. 
143. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §5-101(l) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2007). 
144. Jd. §5-501(l)(3). 
145. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, supra note 20. 
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the Maryland General Assembly has asserted that Maryland's 
jurisdiction extends to those interstate waters that flow into the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
Maryland has other legislation in place reflecting this jurisdictional 
claim. The Maryland Department of the Environment (the 
Department) may adopt a regulation or rule regarding water pollution 
that "[a]ppl[ies] to sources located outside [the] State that cause, 
contribute to, or threaten environmental damage in [the] State.,,146 
Additionally, Maryland's statutory scheme carries criminal sanctions 
for anyone who, through either act or omission, violates any water 
pollution rule enacted by the Department. 147 By empowering the 
Department to set rules that regulate out-of-state sources, the 
Maryland General Assembly has asserted that Maryland's 
jurisdiction extends beyond state borders. Not only may the 
Department promulgate regulations that affect out-of-state sources of 
pollution, but the Attorney General of Maryland or State's Attorneys 
of counties bordering the Bay may also bring actions against polluters 
beyond state borders. 148 Thus, by virtue of Maryland's statutory 
scheme, the Maryland General Assembly has demonstrated its desire 
for Maryland courts to hear criminal cases against those out-of-state 
polluters who have violated Maryland's environmental laws. 
Even though Maryland's courts have subject matter jurisdiction, 
the court must have territorial jurisdiction over the claim before it 
may proceed as a court may not act on subject matter jurisdiction 
alone. 149 
2. Maryland Can Exercise Territorial Jurisdiction Over Acts Which 
Have Effects That Are Felt Within Its Borders 
Maryland uses the common law rule of territorial jurisdiction to 
determine whether a Maryland court may properly exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over a defendant. lso Generally, for a state to 
have territorial jurisdiction over a defendant, the crime itself must 
146. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 9-313(c}(2) (LexisNexis 2007). 
147. See id. § 9-343(a). 
148. Id. § 5-1106 (noting that the Attorney General of Maryland may initiate an action 
against an alleged polluter who is operating "anywhere in the area of the Chesapeake 
Bay and the tidewater portions of the Chesapeake Bay's tributaries"). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 81 and 82. 
150. See State v. Butier, 353 Md. 67, 73, 724 A.2d 657, 660 (1999). "[I]t is well-settled in 
Maryland that a court must have territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defendant to 
exercise its jurisdiction, or power, over that defendant." /d. at 78, 724 A.2d at 662. 
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have been committed in that state. 151 Therefore, territorial 
jurisdiction usually means that a person cannot be convicted of a 
crime in Maryland unless the crime itself was committed within 
Maryland's borders. 152 This rule, however, is subject to exceptions 
that allow states to criminally prosecute individuals for acts 
committed outside of a state's territory.153 One exception comes into 
play when an essential element of a crime occurs within one state 
while the other elements occur out-of-state. 154 Another exception 
applies when a defendant's intended act performed outside of a 
state's territory causes detrimental effects within that state (the 
effects exception). 155 
Maryland courts have used these exceptions to gain jurisdiction 
over criminal defendants whose out-of-state actions had 
consequential effects within Maryland. 156 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland set forth the reasoning behind the application of this 
exception in State v. Butler. 157 The Court held that: 
[1]f a person, while in one state sets into motion a force 
which operates in another state, the actual presence of the 
offender in the other state is not necessary to make him 
amenable to its laws for the crime committed there, if an 
offense is an immediate result of his action.158 
Based on the rationale of the effects exception, a state has the 
authority to exercise territorial jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
polluter whose actions affect that state. This is because an out-of-
state polluter, by expelling pollutants into interstate waterways that 
flow into the Bay, in fact "sets in motion a force which operates in 
151. Khalifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 421, 855 A.2d 1175, 1187 (2004). 
152. See id. at 421,855 A.2d at 1187. 
153. See Butler, 353 Md. at 74, 724 A.2d at 660. 
154. See West v. State, 369 Md. 150, 158-59, 797 A.2d 1278, 1283 (2001) ("[T]he 
common law rule generally focuses on one element, which is deemed 'essential' or 
'key' or 'vital' or the 'graveman' of the offense, and the offense may be prosecuted 
only in a jurisdiction where that essential or key element takes place."). 
155. See Butler, 353 Md. at 78, 724 A.2d at 662-63 (quoting Urciolo v. State, 272 Md. 
607, 631, 325 A.2d 878, 892 (1974)). This jurisdiction, however, is limited to causes 
of action arising from the acts and its effects. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971 & Supp. I 1988). For instance, Maryland could not 
claim jurisdiction over an individual for out-of-state pollution that reached Maryland 
waters, and then charge that individual with an unrelated breach of contract claim. 
156. See, e.g., Khalifa, 382 Md. at 422-24, 855 A.2d at 1188; Trindle v. State, 326 Md. 
25, 31-32, 602 A.2d 1232, 1235 (1992). 
157. 353 Md. 67, 724 A.2d 657 (1999). 
158. Id. at 78, 724 A.2d at 663 (citing 21 AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 386 (1965)). 
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another state.,,159 Waterborne pollution, by nature, is migratory and 
will travel downstream into the waters of neighboring states. 160 The 
polluter commits the initial act and gravity takes care of the rest. In 
Maryland, if a polluter discharges into the Susquehanna River, he is 
acting in a manner that has direct and ultimate effects within this state 
since the water carrying the pollutants ultimately mixes with 
Maryland's waters. 
The application of the effects exception is not this simple, however, 
and is subject to several limitations. The rationale described above is 
merely a basic foundation to a court's analysis of the existence of 
territorial jurisdiction. First, for a court to have territorial jurisdiction 
over a defendant, the defendant's conduct must be illegal in both 
states. 161 Additionally, there must be some level of scienter displayed 
by the defendant that shows his actions were "intended" to affect 
another state. 162 Finally, the basic tenets of personal jurisdiction must 
be satisfied for an out-of-state defendant to be tried in a foreign 
court. 163 
a. The acts must be illegal in both states 
A person may not be held criminally liable in one state for acts 
committed in another state that are not prohibited in that other 
state. l64 In Nielsen v. Oregon,165 for example, Nielsen, a citizen of 
Washington, was charged with violating Oregon's criminal statute 
prohibiting the use of a purse net to fish in the Columbia River.166 
However, Washington permitted the use of purse nets in the 
Columbia River and had granted Nielsen a license to use such a 
net. 167 Oregon claimed that it could exercise its territorial jurisdiction 
over Nielsen because it had concurrent jurisdiction over the river with 
Washington and thus, was within its rights to criminally prosecute 
him. 168 The Supreme Court held otherwise. 169 In essence, the Court 
felt that to uphold his conviction would allow "Oregon, by virtue of 
159. ld. 
160. SeeWATERSATRISK,supranote 17, at 1-2. 
161. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315,320-21 (1909). 
162. See, e.g., Kha1ifa v. State, 382 Md. 400, 422, 855 A.2d 1175, 1187 (2004). 
163. Spencer, supra note 73, at 617. 
164. See, e.g., Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 320. 
165. 212 U.S. 315 (1909). 
166. ld. at 315-16. 
167. ld. at 316. 
168. See id. at 321. 
169. ld. 
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its concurrent jurisdiction, [to] disregard [Washington's] 
authority ... and punish a man for doing within the territorial limits 
of Washington an act which that state had specially authorized him to 
dO.,,170 While the Supreme Court held that Oregon could not sustain 
a conviction in this instance, had Washington also prohibited the use 
of such nets, Oregon would be within its rights to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 171 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court on the other hand, in State v. 
Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 172 upheld a conviction of an out-of-state 
defendant, finding that the laws of both the forum state and New 
York criminalized the activity involved.173 Specifically, the court 
found that the trial court had a proper basis to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction over the co-defendant, Penthouse Magazine, because the 
publication violated both New Hampshire's and New York's 
obscenity laws. 174 Jurisdiction was affirmed despite the fact that all 
of Penthouse's activities occurred within New York. 175 
Applying this rule to the extraterritorial enforcement of Maryland's 
criminal environmental laws presents a challenge. While Maryland 
may be adversely affected by the acts of an upstream polluter, I 76 
under this rule, it may only gain territorial jurisdiction if the conduct 
is illegal in the state where the actual act of pollution occurs.l77 
However, Maryland can still exercise territorial jurisdiction over 
those defendants who pollute in violation of their own state's laws 
and, accordingly, Maryland's. I78 Also, through the various interstate 
compacts to which Maryland is a party, a push can be made for the 
uniformity of the laws of the party states. Increased uniformity of the 
law will enable Maryland to gain territorial jurisdiction over out-of-
state polluters. It is not important whether neighboring states decide 
to prosecute their citizens; what truly matters is that the conduct of 
those citizens is a violation of both states' laws. 
Although an act of pollution may violate both Maryland's and 
another state's laws, the effects exception requires that the effects of 
170. ld. 
171. Jd. at 320-21. 
172. 388 A.2d 190 (N.H. 1978). 
173. Jd. at 199. 
174. Jd. at 196. 
175. ld. at 195-96. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20 for a discussion of how Maryland's waters 
are affected by the acts of upstream polluters. 
177. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315,321 (1909). 
178. See id. at 320. 
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the act are "intended" to be felt in Maryland. 179 This suggests that 
there must be a specific level of scienter that the actor is in some 
sense targeting Maryland. The next section explores this idea and 
shows that, as interpreted, this level of scienter is akin to whether it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the effects will be felt in Maryland. 
b. Requisite level of scienter for the effects exception to territorial 
jurisdiction 
The requirement that the effects of an out-of-state criminal act are 
intended to lay within Maryland seems to be a formidable obstacle to 
territorial jurisdiction at first blush. It would be next to impossible to 
demonstrate that a particular polluter specifically targeted Maryland 
waters by discharging pollutants into interstate waterways. However, 
this intent is equivalent to whether it is reasonably foreseeable that 
the effects will be felt in Maryland. Trindle v. State l80 is a good 
example of how "intended effects" is more or less equivalent to a 
"reasonably foreseeable" standard. 181 
In Trindle, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it had 
territorial jurisdiction over a criminal defendant when the intended 
effects of the criminal action were in Maryland, despite the fact that 
all elements of the crime were committed in another jurisdiction. I 82 
Trindle is a criminal case involving the abduction of a child by his 
father, the defendant, in Delaware, who then left Delaware for Jordan 
with the child. 183 After being denied entry to Jordan, the defendant 
returned to the United States with the child. 184 The defendant 
challenged the Maryland court's jurisdiction over him on the grounds 
that all of the actual elements of the crime occurred in Delaware. 18S 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court was 
correct to exercise jurisdiction over him since the intended effect of 
the abduction was to deprive the mother of custody over the child, 
179. Khalifa v. State, 388 Md. 400, 422, 855 A.2d 1175, 1187 (2004) (quoting State v. 
Butler, 353 Md. 67, 74, 724 A.2d 657, 660 (1999)). 
180. 326 Md. 25, 602 A.2d 1232 (1992). 
181. Compare id. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235 (asserting that jurisdiction will be upheld even 
though acts took place outside the state if the intended result has its effects in the 
state), with Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding jurisdiction is 
proper if one can "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there")). 
182. Trindle, 326 Md. at 32,602 A.2d at 1235. 
183. Id. at 28-29,602 A.2d at 1233-34. 
184. ld. at 30, 602 A,2d at 1234. 
185. ld. 
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and the mother was a Maryland resident. 186 Because the intended 
effect of the abduction rested in Maryland with the mother, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that Maryland had sufficient basis to 
exercise territorial jurisdiction over the defendant despite the fact that 
all of the acts necessary to complete the crime occurred outside of 
Maryland. 187 The intent to deprive the mother of the child was 
inferred by the Court of Appeals of Maryland and arose from his 
intent to take possession of the child. 188 While it was his intent to 
take custody of the child, the immediately foreseeable consequence 
of his actions would simultaneously deprive the mother of her 
child. 189 
In Commonwealth v. Fa/one,19o the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts found that the proper basis for territorial jurisdiction 
was lacking since there was no circumstantial evidence 
demonstrating that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen his 
actions having effects in Massachusetts. 191 Fa/one was a drug 
trafficking case involving the sale of a distributable amount of 
cocaine by a Florida resident, Fafone, to a Massachusetts resident, 
Campiti, in Florida. 192 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held there was insufficient evidence to support the exercise of 
territorial jurisdiction over Fafone. 193 The denial of jurisdiction was 
based on the fact that although Campiti sold the drugs in 
Massachusetts, there was no evidence that Fafone was aware of 
Campiti's plan at the time of the sale. 194 The court found evidence 
was lacking that Fafone knew Campiti lived in Massachusetts. 195 
This suggests that had Fafone known of Campiti's residence, he 
would have been aware that the drugs would be sold in 
Massachusetts, and territorial jurisdiction would have been pro~er 
because the ultimate effects were intended to lie in Massachusetts. 6 
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized that 
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants for acts committed entirely 
in another state is proper if it is reasonably foreseeable that the effects 
186. Id. at 32, 602 A.2d at 1235. 
187. Id. 
188. See id. at 29,32,602 A.2d at 1234-35. 
189. See id. at 29,602 A.2d at 1234-35. 
190. 621 N.E.2d 1178 (Mass. 1993). 
191. Id. at 1179. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
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of their actions will be felt in the forum state. 197 In Calder v. 
Jones,198 the Supreme Court held that California had jurisdiction over 
two Florida newspapermen whose slanderous story about Shirley 
Jones was published in the National Enquirer. 199 Jurisdiction arose 
out of the fact that the ultimate effects of the newspapermen's 
deliberate acts rested in California where Shirley Jones resided?OO 
Even though their article was aimed at Shirley Jones, the Court found 
that the ultimate effect occurred in California?OI The propriety of 
jurisdiction was based on the fact that it was reasonably foreseeable 
to the defendants that they may have to answer for their actions in 
California; because they knew where Jones lived, they knew where 
the effects of their actions would be felt. 202 
The reasoning set forth in these cases demonstrates that the 
determination of whether a particular effect of an act is intended to be 
felt in another state is based upon whether it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the effect will lie in another state?03 These cases demonstrate 
that whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the effects of an act will 
be felt in another state depends on the knowledge of the defendant at 
the time the act was committed?04 The defendant's knowledge can 
be inferred from circumstantial evidence and is a question of fact. 205 
However, this knowledge must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 206 
In the case of out-of-state pollution, knowledge could be inferred 
from such factors as proximity to an interstate waterway, known 
hydrological connections, as well as proximity to the state border.207 
These factors can be used to show that based on the knowledge held 
by the polluter at the time of the discharge, it was reasonably 
197. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984). 
198. 465 U.S. 783. 
199. Id. at 783, 787. 
200. Id. at 791. 
201. Id. at 789. 
202. Id. at 790 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)) (stating that "[u]nder the circumstances, petitioners must 'reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court [in California], to answer for the truth of the 
statements made in their article"). 
203. See id. at 783-84; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297; Commonwealth 
v. Fafone, 621 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (1993); Trindle v. State, 326 Md. 25,32,602 A.2d 
1232, 1235 (1992). 
204. See World-Wide Volkswagen CO/p., 444 U.S. at 315; Fafone, 621 N.E.2d at 1179. 
205. State v. Butler, 353 Md. 67, 79, 724 A.2d 657, 663 (1999). 
206. Id. at 83-84, 724 A.2d at 665. 
207. Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate 
Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 842, 845 (1989). 
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foreseeable that the effects of his actions would be felt in 
Maryland.208 This, in tum, would subject the polluter to Maryland's 
territorial jurisdiction. 
While Maryland can conceivably gain territorial jurisdiction over 
out-of-state polluters, this exercise is necessarily limited by the rules 
of personal jurisdiction.209 It is the exercise of personal jurisdiction, 
along with its accompanying due process concerns, that acts as the 
largest obstacle for the extraterritorial enforcement of Maryland's 
criminal environmental laws. 
3. For Maryland Courts to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over Out-
of-State Polluters, Several Due Process Concerns Must Be 
Overcome 
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant to bind 
her by its judgment.210 Thus, without the proper basis for personal 
jurisdiction, a cause of action against an out-of-state polluter will 
fai1. 2lI It is widely recognized that it is constitutional for a court to 
hold personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state.212 However, 
while a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant in 
any state, due process requires that the defendant have "certain 
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice. ",213 In addition to discussing the requirement of 
minimum contacts, this section will also address other relevant 
substantive due process concerns as well as procedural due process 
concerns relating to personal jurisdiction. 
a. Due process requires that the defendant has minimum contacts 
with the forum state for the state to exercise personal jurisdiction 
The concept of minimum contacts arose as a "surrogate[] of 
presence" for the defendant in the forum state.214 Whether a 
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such 
208. Cj World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297. 
209. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 388 A.2d 190,195 (N.H. 1978). 
210. Spencer, supra note 73, at 617-18. 
211. Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies/or Pollution, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 121,207 n.452 (1985). 
212. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984). 
213. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940». 
214. Spencer, supra note 73, at 622. Prior to minimum contacts, the actual presence of the 
defendant or an authorized agent of the defendant in the forum state was required for 
proper service of process and, thus, proper personal jurisdiction. ld. 
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that an exercise of personal jurisdiction does not violate due process 
is a concern that cannot be ignored, especially with the course of 
action that this Comment has thus far proposed. There is no magic 
number of contacts, nor is there a certain type of contact, that 
automatically satisfies a due process analysis. Instead, the contacts 
must be judged on a case-by-case basis by the court to determine 
whether they are sufficient for personal jurisdiction.2ls When a court 
attempts to determine whether sufficient contacts exist, the court 
must evaluate "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and 
the litigation.,,216 This analysis largely turns on a balancing of the 
type of litigation involved, the type of defendant, and the interest of 
the forum state.217 Any inconvenience to the defendant is also 
considered.218 
1. Considerations of the type oflitigation involved when analyzing 
minimum contacts 
The requirement of minimum contacts is a product of the civil 
judicial system and has not been explicitly applied to criminal 
personal jurisdiction.219 This opens up the question of whether there 
is a distinction between civil and criminal· actions as to whether 
minimum contacts with the forum state are even required. The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, decided that such a distinction 
does, in fact, exist.22o The court stated: 
Nor are we convinced that the minimum contacts analysis 
could or should be applied to all criminal proceedings. 
Application of this standard to natural persons charged with 
criminal offenses might mean that a criminal judgment 
could be rendered against a natural person even if he were 
absent from the jurisdiction. Such a result might render 
nugatory, for example, ... our extradition statute. It might 
also raise serious constitutional questions.22I 
Although the reasoning behind the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire's analysis is logical, it is by no means the majority 
215. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,204 (1977). 
216. Calder, 465 U.S. at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204). 
217. Spencer, supra note 73, at 623. 
218. Id. 
219. State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 388 A.2d 190,193-94 (N.H. 1978). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 194. 
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view.222 Since there is still no clear authority that states such a 
distinction exists, it is important to evaluate how extraterritorial 
enforcement of environmental crimes can satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement. 
11. Considerations of the type of defendant involved when analyzing 
minimum contacts 
It is often easier to gain personal jurisdiction over a corporation 
than a single defendant when analyzing minimum contacts with the 
state.223 A corporation's contacts with a state may be established 
through its place of business, its place of incorporation, its business 
dealings, and through agency relationships.224 An individual, on the 
other hand, often does not have such contacts with the forum state, 
thus it is often much more difficult to demonstrate that sufficient 
minimum contacts exist.225 However, the holding of the Supreme 
Court in Calder demonstrates that the effects of a single act can 
satisfy the requirement of minimum contacts with the forum state?26 
In Calder, the Supreme Court found that California properly 
exercised personal jurisdiction over two defendants based solely on 
the effects of their conduct within California and not on any other 
contacts.227 It follows that a determination as to whether the 
individual defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum 
state can be evaluated solely on the effects of the alleged act and not 
on other factors. Maryland may thus exercise personal jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state polluter based on the effects of her actions within 
Maryland without offending due process. 
There is a limitation on determining that this type of effects-based 
contact satisfies the minimum contacts re~uirement. The action must 
be limited to the effects of the act itself,22 and the act, by its effects, 
222. Only one other state, Wyoming, has adopted the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's 
view. See Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242,244 (Wyo. 1987). 
223. A defendant for the purpose of this paper includes both individuals as well as 
corporations. 
224. Int'I Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316-18,324 (1945). 
225. See, e.g., Krambeer v. Eisenberg, 923 F. Supp. 1170, 1174-76 (D. Minn. 1996) 
(minimum contacts were not established through a single letter sent to the forum 
state); Dixon v. Ashley, 640 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (individual could 
not establish minimum contacts due to the fact he never visited the forum state). 
226. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-90 (1984). 
227. Id. at 788-89. 
228. Spencer, supra note 73, at 622 (citing Int" Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317) (stating that 
"single and isolated contacts would support jurisdiction only where they were related 
to the action"). 
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must implicate a legitimate state interest.229 Because her actions 
implicated a legitimate state interest, the defendant has created the 
necessary "link that makes it fair and non-arbitrary for that state" to 
properly exercise personal jurisdiction over her.23o Rather than 
asking whether or not the defendant has established minimum 
contacts, "the question becomes whether the defendant acted in a way 
that implicates a state's interests such that it may adjudicate any 
resultant dispute.,,231 
iii. Considerations of a state's interest involved when analyzing 
minimum contacts 
Requiring that a legitimate state interest be implicated to satisfy 
minimum contacts sufficiently protects the defendant from unfair and 
arbitrary actions.232 The Supreme Court has recognized that 
triggering a legitimate state interest can satisfy, or in fact supplant, 
the minimum contacts requirement.233 In Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc.,234 the Supreme Court expressly stated that personal 
jurisdiction based upon the triggering of a state interest is not 
fundamentally unfair and thus not a violation of due process.235 
"[T]he 'fairness' of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court 
depends to some extent on whether respondent's activities relating to 
New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest in 
holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those 
activities.'.23 
Based on the line of reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in 
the above cases, Maryland may successfully exercise personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state polluters, so long as their actions trigger 
a significant state interest. The analysis must then shift to whether 
the effects of out-of-state pollution trigger a legitimate state interest 
229. ld. at 644--45. 
230. ld. at 645. 
231. ld. 
232. ld. at 646. 
233. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating 
that "the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts ... is so insistent 
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the rjght of its courts to determine 
the interests of all claimants, resident or nonresident"); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 
783, 788-89 (1984) (holding that the effects of defendant's actions were sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction based on California's interest in protecting its 
citizens). 
234. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
235. ld. at 775-76. 
236. ld. 
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that would permit Maryland to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
such a defendant. 
Maryland's state interest in preventing the pollution of its waters by 
out-of-state sources of pollutants is legitimate, for "[a] state has a 
natural interest in the effects of an act within its territory even though 
the act itself was done elsewhere.,,237 However, jurisdiction based on 
state interest is not found at common law, but has been accepted 
when the state interest is expressly protected by statute,z38 
Maryland expresses its legitimate state interest in preventing the 
pollution of its waters from both in-state and out-of-state sources 
through statute.239 Specifically, the Maryland General Assembly 
declared that water "pollution constitutes a menace to public health 
and welfare" and that "the problem of water pollution in [Maryland] 
is closelx related to the problem of water pollution in adjoining 
states. ,,24 Through its declaration that pollution of state waters is a 
"menace" and by recognizing that pollution can enter Maryland's 
waters from out-of-state sources, Maryland has created a statutory 
interest in preventing the effects of out-of-state pollution within its 
borders. 
Although the effects of out-of-state pollution trigger Maryland's 
interest, a minimum contacts analysis still requires balancing this 
interest with the potential inconvenience to the defendant.241 As the 
following section demonstrates, however, any inconvenience that a 
defendant may incur is minimal in comparison to Maryland's interest 
in this matter. 
iv. Considerations of any inconvenience to the defendant when 
analyzing minimum contacts 
Due process is concerned with notions of fundamental fairness, 
therefore a determination of whether personal jurisdiction is proper 
looks at the inconvenience posed to the defendant by litigating in a 
foreign state. 242 As Professor Benjamin Spencer has noted, "it is hard 
to imagine any remaining vitality to notions of inconvenience and 
burden to travel within the United States that can rise to levels of 
constitutional concern" given the advancements in technology and 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. a (1971). 
238. Id. at § 37 cmt. b. 
239. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 4-405(c) (LexisNexis 2007). 
240. Id. § 4-402. 
241. Spencer, supra note 73, at 627. 
242. Id. 
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transportation.243 Nonetheless) inconvenience is still a concern that 
courts will take into account.244 
To deal with this concern in the context of out-of-state polluters, 
the location of the defendant in relation to Maryland should be taken 
into account. Inconvenience logically diminishes the closer the 
defendant is to the state line. Furthermore, defendants within the 
states surrounding Maryland should place little faith in inconvenience 
as a reasonable challenge to personal jurisdiction. This is primarily 
because inconvenience is viewed as the cost and burden of traveling 
long distances to the forum state,245 but as Calder demonstrates, 
traveling the expanse of the United States was not an 
inconvenience.246 
The Supreme Court has demonstrated that the issue of 
inconvenience to the defendant has taken a backseat to whether the 
defendant's acts have triggered a legitimate state interest.247 The 
exercise of personal jurisdiction, however, must still include the 
necessary procedures to satis~ due process, namely proper notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. 48 
b. Procedural due process concerns with personal jurisdiction 
Procedural due process requires that the defendant be afforded 
proper notice and an opportunity to be heard?49 Notice is of primary 
importance.25o Notice is essential because "personal jurisdiction ... 
depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that 
an action has been brought.,,251 Notice is accomplished through 
effective service of process, which can be achieved in several ways. 
A corporation that operates within the state must have an agent in the 
state whose duties include receiving the service of process.252 It 
243. Id. at 632 (stating that the common use of airplanes, faxes, and the Internet has 
greatly reduced any legitimate burden of a defendant having to travel to the forum 
state). 
244. Id. at 627. 
245. Id. at 628 (citing Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REv. 1112, 1132 (1981 ». 
246. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (holding that it was proper for 
California to exercise jurisdiction over two Florida newspapermen even though they 
had to travel from Florida to California). 
247. See id. at 788-89, 791. 
248. Spencer, supra note 73, at 643. 
249. Id. at 626. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978». 
252. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 1-401 (a) (LexisNexis 2007). 
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becomes more difficult to obtain jurisdiction over the individual who 
is out-of-state and has no agent in state who can be served.253 Many 
states use long-arm statutes to gain personal jurisdiction over an out-
of-state defendant who has no agent to receive service?54 
Maryland can easily satisfy the notice requirement with regard to 
those corporations that operate within the state, for they must have a 
local agent within Maryland who receives service of process.255 The 
problem arises when Maryland attempts to satisfy the notice 
requirement to gain personal jurisdiction over out-of-state individuals 
who have no agent. Maryland has statutes in place stating that 
Maryland may impose regulations on out-of-state sources of pollution 
that damage Maryland's environment, and the provisions within these 
statutes also contain criminal penalties for violations.256 Maryland, 
however, lacks a clearly defined criminal sanction for out-of-state 
pollution and a specially-designed long-arm statute to reach such 
individuals.257 The Maryland General Assembly can directly address 
this problem by passing a long-arm statute particular to out-of-state 
polluters whose discharge reaches Maryland's waters. Enacting such 
a statute would enable Maryland to give sufficient notice to those 
out-of-state polluters it seeks to prosecute and simultaneously solidify 
the state's personal jurisdiction over such defendants. 
IV. FUTURE STEPS THAT CAN SERVE TO ENHANCE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
Extraterritorial enforcement of criminal sanctions will only be as 
effective as the law will allow. Currently, there are several gaps in 
legislation that stand as direct impediments to the effective use of this 
enforcement method. The first problem is that one of the largest 
sources of pollution in the Bay, nitrogen pollution from agricultural 
livestock activities, has gone largely unregulated.258 Farms are faced 
with the same economic disincentive as corporations to amend their 
253. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Maryland's Diminished Long-Arm Jurisdiction in the Wake of 
Zavian v. Foudy, 31 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,6 (2001) (explaining that the International 
Shoe Court recognized the difficulty of conditioning jurisdiction on physical presence 
in the forum state). 
254. See id. 
255. MD. CODE ANN., CORPs. & ASS'NS § 1-40 1 (b). 
256. For a discussion of the relevant portions of Maryland's statutory scheme, see supra 
Part IlI.C.I.b. 
257. See infra Part IV.B. 
258. WATERS AT RISK, supra note 17, at 2-3. 
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practices to a manner that is more environmentally friendly.259 Thus, 
new legislation must be adopted that will bring these farms into the 
regulatory fold and subject them to the various sanctions, induding 
criminal liability, that serve as strong deterrents to practices that 
damage the environment. 
The second problem that faces extraterritorial environmental 
criminal jurisdiction relates to ambiguities within the statutory 
scheme and the absence of a sufficient long-arm statute for these 
matters. In particular, by amending Maryland's definition of state 
waters, modifying the language of Maryland's criminal water 
pollution statutes, and establishing a sufficient long-arm statute, the 
Maryland General Assembly can ensure that measures to protect the 
Bay are greatly enhanced. This Comment will next discuss what 
must be done on the agricultural front before turning to the specific 
legislative changes that must occur. 
A. Bringing Agricultural Activities into the Regulatory Fold Will 
Provide a Strong Incentive/or These Farms to Come into 
Compliance Because Criminal Liability Will Attach 
One of the most pressing issues facing the restoration of the Bay is 
the need for more stringent regulation of agricultural activity along 
the tributaries that empty into the Bay.26o The deterrence factor of 
extending criminal liability to out-of-state agricultural activities can 
have an immediate and profound effect on compliance.261 
The effects of the agricultural livestock industry have a tremendous 
and well-documented negative effect on the health of the Bay?62 The 
farminf industry is a leading cause of nitrogen pollution in the 
Bay,26 yet efforts to date have placed the priorities of these farms on 
259. Tom Pelton, Suit Threat Frustrates Hog Farmers, BALT. SUN, Jan. 22, 2007, at IA 
(indicating that fanners that they cannot afford the changes required by the 
regulations). 
260. Id. These farms corral large amounts of livestock in a single area (i.e., 3,000 pigs on 
one farm). Id. The fanns collect their manure in large storage tanks which are later 
connected to irrigation lines. Id. The irrigation lines then spread the manure over the 
fields, fertilizing crops. Id. 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 41-47. 
262. WATERS AT RISK, supra note 17, at 3-4. Manure and fertilizer run-off from 
agricultural activities are a leading cause of nitrogen and phosphate pollution in the 
Bay. Id. at 2. 
263. "About [forty] percent of the nitrogen pollution that causes low-oxygen 'dead-zones' 
in the [B]ay comes from fann pollution, and about half of this is from animal manure 
.... " Tom Pelton, Pollution Lawsuits Threatened, BALT. SUN, Jan. 9, 2007, at 5B. 
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the same level as the health of the Bay.264 The lack of strict 
regulation surrounding the agricultural industry directly contributes 
to the lack of improvement in the health of the Bay. 265 
The main problem facing the eventual regulation of the agricultural 
industry is the perception of driving the family owned farms out of 
business due to the costs that accompany the change-which to say 
the least, is an unpopular suggestion?66 No politician wants to be 
viewed by his or her constituents as favoring the extinction of the 
American family farm?67 It would seem that any regulation aimed at 
minimizing the adverse effects of livestock on the Bay could be spun 
in a manner to appear as a direct attack on the farmer. 268 The 
majority of Americans have little problem with strict regulations and 
criminal penalties for large corporate rolluters but view farming 
operations in an entirely different light. 26 
Even though farmers may not be on the same public level as a 
faceless corporate polluter, they are nonetheless polluters, and major 
ones at that. 270 Efforts to enforce changes through various federal 
and state grants have failed to bring about the desired result; a new 
approach is therefore needed.271 Recently, two Pennsylvania 
environmental groups (Penn Future and the Pennsylvania 
Riverkeepers) decided that more drastic measures were needed; so 
the groups began to threaten the hog farmers along the Susquehanna 
with lawsuits if they continued to refuse to comply with the 
permitting requirements.272 Their actions have been met with a 
mixed response; some have applauded the efforts, while others have 
expressed displeasure over the threats?73 One scholar, Howard 
264. Instead of engaging farmers in litigation, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's "Save the 
Farm, Save the Bay" campaign advocates for increased government funding to assist 
and encourage farmers to make the necessary changes to comply with regulations. 
Pelton, supra note 259. 
265. William C. Baker, Let's Truly Treasure the Chesapeake, BALT. SUN, Jan. 23, 2007, at 
IIA ("There is broad consensus that the most cost-effective plan to reduce pollution 
is to implement the agricultural conservation practices outlined in the tributary 
strategies. However, implementation has been woefully inadequate. That must 
change."). 
266. See generally Pelton, supra note 259, at IA. 
267. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. 
268. Pelton, supra note 259. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Baker, supra note 265. 
272. Pelton, supra note 259. 
273. Id. 
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Ernst,274 explained that the use of litigation is long overdue; it fills in 
the necessary void in the current scheme.275 
In the end, whether through litigation or through government 
funding, agricultural livestock operations must be brought within the 
regulatory fold. Once inside the regulatory system, they will be 
subject to the same penalties as the rest of the regulated community, 
including criminal liability. 
As stated earlier, attacking the farmer will adversely affect a 
politician's career, thus, enforcement problems will continue to be a 
problem. This can be overcome by Maryland enforcing its criminal 
laws against out-of-state farming operations that continue to ignore 
the regulations of their own state and consistently contribute to the 
substantial level of nitrogen pollution in the Bay. 
Agricultural activities can best be brought into the regulatory fold 
through the passage of new legislation mandating specific practices 
limiting the nitrogen output of such operations. By successfully 
passing such legislation along with a specially-designed long-arm 
statute to reach continued violations, Maryland can effectively 
enforce its criminal environmental sanctions against these upstream 
agricultural sites. 
B. Future Legislation Is Required to Enable Effective 
Extraterritorial Enforcement of Maryland's Criminal 
Environmental Statutes 
Oregon's statutory scheme can serve as a model by which the 
Maryland General Assembly may draft its own statutory scheme that 
would effectively accommodate extraterritorial enforcement of 
Maryland's criminal environmental sanctions. Three areas in 
particular should be redrafted based on the language in the Oregon 
statutes. First, Oregon's definition of "waters of the state" is more 
expansive than Maryland's~ it clearly extends jurisdiction to the 
waters that enter the state.27 Next, the Maryland General Assembly 
should follow Oregon's lead by clearly defining a criminal act that 
will place liability on an out-of-state polluter.277 Finally, the 
274. Howard Ernst is a political science professor who studies Bay restoration at the 
Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Id. 
275. Id. Ernst described the funding efforts used by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation as 
"carrots" where litigation acted as a "stick" to force compliance. He concluded that 
both approaches must be included in an effective regulatory plan to curb pollution 
stemming from agricultural activities. Id. 
276. See infra Part IV.B.l. 
277. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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Maryland General Assembly should adopt a long arm statute similar 
to Oregon's statute, which asserts jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants whose actions, by their effects, implicate Oregon's state 
interest. 278 
r. How the Statutory Definition of "State Waters" Must Be 
Aunended . 
Oregon's definition of "waters of the state" can serve as a model by 
which the Maryland General Assembly may amend the definition of 
Maryland's state waters. Oregon has included in its definition of 
"waters of the state" those bodies of water that are "wholly or 
partially within or bordering the state.,,279 If Maryland were to adopt 
similar language, the Maryland General Assembly would be asserting 
that any discharge into any river that reaches Maryland is a potential 
violation. In particular, it will allow Maryland to more effectively 
assert claims against polluters along the Potomac and Susquehanna 
Rivers. Under the new statutory scheme, jurisdiction would be 
proper because the illegal discharge found its way into Maryland 
state waters. The general territorial jurisdiction analysis would 
follow because the illegal acts would occur within Maryland 
territory; thus~ any concerns about the propriety of jurisdiction would 
be remedied.2 0 
2. Aunending the Statutory Language Will Clearly Define the 
Criminal Act 
An additional area in which Oregon may serve as a model is 
through its definition of a criminal water pollution violation. Oregon 
bases criminal liability for water pollution on whether an individual 
knowin~ly or negligentl/81 acts in a manner that pollutes Oregon's 
waters. 2 By stating that "[ n]o person shall ... [c ]ause pollution of 
any waters of the state,,,283 Oregon has clearly defined the criminal 
act. By including a general causation requirement, this statute 
278. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
279. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 468B.005 (2005). It should be noted that New York defines 
state waters similarly, including all interstate waters that enter its territory. N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. L. § 17-0105 (McKinney 2006). 
280. See supra text accompanying notes 150-60. 
281. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 468.943-.946 (2005). 
282. [d. § 468B.025. 
283. [d. 
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squarely places liability on anyone, whether in-state or out-of-state, 
who acts in a manner that causes the pollution of state waters.284 
If Maryland adopts the same langua~es the effects exception to 
territorial jurisdiction comes into play. 8 Since the crime itself 
would require only that a defendant cause pollution of Maryland 
waters, this pollution could come from out-of-state defendants who 
polluted interstate waterways flowing into the Bay.z86 Additionally, 
if it was reasonably foreseeable that the defendant's pollution would 
enter Maryland waters, the effects could be considered intended as 
well, thus meeting the necessary level of scienter.287 
By redrafting the statutory definition of "waters of the state" as 
well as adopting a statute that clearly defines the criminal act, 
Maryland will exercise territorial jurisdiction over out-of-state 
polluters who affect Maryland's waters. Maryland, however, 
currently lacks an effective long-arm statute that will overcome the 
procedural due process concerns associated with personal jurisdiction 
in this type of action.288 This is yet another area where the Oregon 
statute can serve as a model for the Maryland General Assembly. 
3. Maryland Must Have an Effective Long-Arm Statute to Assert 
Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Polluters 
Oregon's long-arm statute expressly asserts jurisdiction if "[t]he 
offense violates a statute of this state that expressly prohibits conduct 
outside this state affecting a legislatively protected interest of or 
within this state and the actor has reason to know that the conduct of 
the actor is likely to affect that interest. ,,289 The language of this 
statute sufficiently addresses the substantive due process concerns of 
personal jurisdiction, which require that a legitimate state interest be 
implicated to satisfy minimum contacts.290 The implementation of 
similar language would also satisfy the notice requirement of 
procedural due process.291 
In creating an effective long-arm statute, the Maryland General 
Assembly must ensure that the statute can reach all defendants who 
could reasonably foresee that the effects of their pollution would be 
284. See id. 
285. For a discussion of the effects exception, see supra Part III.C.2. 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56. 
287. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
288. See supra Part Ill.C.3. 
289. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 131.215 (2005). 
290. See supra Part Ill.C.3.a.iii. 
291. See supra Part III.C.3.b. 
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felt in Maryland.292 The reach of the statute can be justified by citing 
Maryland's significant state interest in preventing the pollution of its 
waters, particularly the Bay.293 The Maryland General Assembly may 
then declare that anyone who pollutes the Chesapeake Bay or its 
tributaries which discharge into these waters, whether in-state or out-
of-state, is acting in a manner that implicates Maryland's legislatively 
protected interest in the quality of her state waters. This in turn can 
serve to create the necessary minimum contacts for personal 
jurisdiction. 
Such a statute will provide the much needed mechanism that 
Maryland needs to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants and finally hold them accountable for the damage they 
continue to cause to Maryland's waters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Current regulatory efforts to revitalize the Bay are stagnant and 
ineffective, and thus, a new mechanism is needed to help solve the 
Bay's severe pollution problems.294 While the Ba<x is polluted 
through various mediums, including air pollution,2 5 waterborne 
contaminants continue to threaten the Bay.296 Much of these 
pollutants flow downstream from out-of-state sources due to a lack of 
effective regulation and enforcement. 297 Effective enforcement must 
be regular and uniform; it must carry sanctions with sufficient 
penalties so as to serve as a truly effective deterrent.298 The 
extraterritorial enforcement of Maryland's criminal environmental 
sanctions is the type of strong deterrent needed to encourage rapid 
compliance with existing regulations. 
The fact that extraterritorial enforcement of criminal environmental 
laws functions within the context of traditional criminal law allows 
states to use several common law doctrines to gain criminal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state polluter.299 Through doctrines like 
the effects exception to territorial jurisdiction, Maryland can 
292. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
293. See supra Part III.C.3.a.iii. 
294. See supra Part I. 
295. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION 2006, supra note 2, at 5. 
296. Id. (stating that evidence ofhennaphrodite bass in the Bay is a clear indication of the 
continued presence of waterborne toxic pollution). 
297. See supra Part II. 
298. See supra Part II. 
299. See supra Part lILA. 
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successfully extend and enforce its criminal environmental statutes 
against out-of-state polluters.30o 
Maryland already has several criminal environmental statutes in 
place that could effectively deter pollution if consistently enforced.301 
What Maryland lacks, however, is a statutory scheme that is designed 
to hold out-of-state polluters criminally liable to the 'state while not 
violating the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction.302 
Specifically, the current statutory scheme lacks a sufficient long-
arm statute and is open to varying interpretations, which places the 
current scheme in danger of being ambiguously construed. In the 
immediate future, the Maryland General Assembly must re-evaluate 
the statutory language, as well as pass new legislation, looking to 
other states like Oregon for guidance.303 Only through statutory 
changes will Maryland effectively extend its jurisdiction over 
individual out-of-state polluters without violating due process. The 
legislature must give Maryland the tools it so desperately needs to 
truly protect its substantial state interest in preserving the quality of 
the Chesapeake Bay. 
300. See supra Part I11.C.2. 
30 J. See supra Part III.C.J.h. 
302. See supra Part III.C.3. 
303. See supra Part IV.B. 
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